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EXCLUDING PATENTABILITY OF THERAPEUTIC
METHODS, INCLUDING METHODS USING
PHARMACEUTICALS, FOR THE TREATMENT OF
HUMANS UNDER TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ARTICLE
27(3)(A)
Michael H. Davis *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS"),' the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), 2 and the World Trade Organization ("WTO")3 debacle has
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School of Law. I must thank Mr. Sachin Java, my research assistant, and the best I have ever had,
for perceptive and professional legal research. I also want to thank Dr. Dana Neacsu, an attorney
and instinctively superb legal talent, and the best wife I have ever had. This Article was made
possible by a grant from the Cleveland-Marshall Fund.
1. TRIPS was one result of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, under which the rules
of so-called intellectual property, previously limited to national legal regimes, were effectively
internationalized and made compulsory upon all World Trade Organization ("WTO") members on
pain of various sanctions. See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 11-28 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter GERVAIS, TRIPS AGREEMENT]. See generally INT'L
CHAMBER COMMERCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE
URUGUAY ROUND TRIPS AGREEMENT (1996) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY].
2. GATT was a postwar forum or organization that administered international trading
practices under its General Agreement. The updated GATT is now the updated agreement under
which the WTO administers international trade. Though paradoxical, anti-intuitive, and a little bit
perverse, GATT actually spawned its own parent, the WTO. See GERVAIS, TRIPS AGREEMENT,
supra note 1, at 3-10, 11-28; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 123-24.
3. The WTO's agreements are often called the Final Act of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round
of Trade Negotiations. The WTO is formally an organization that was founded as a result of the
Uruguay Round of Negotiations that started in 1986 under the GATT accords-negotiatons that
culminated in a 1994 agreement that, as of January 1, 1995, WTO would be the umbrella
organization under which GATT and TRIPS would be administered. GERVAIS, TRIPS AGREEMENT,
supra note 1, at 3, 27-28. Thus, although WTO is structurally the parent organization of GATT, in
fact, it is GATT which fathered WTO. See supra note 2.
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radically altered the traditional ability of nations to adopt whatever
patent regime seems appropriate to them.4 Instead, TRIPS requires all
member nations, even those which never thought it appropriate to grant
such state monopolies, to afford patent protection to areas which had
never been granted before-most dramatically in the area of health-
related innovations and, most expensively, pharmaceuticals. Until
TRIPS, most-or at least a number approaching half-countries simply
did not grant patents to pharmaceuticals based on the notion that nobody
could claim the right to substances and methods essential for human
life.6 TRIPS appears to require most nations in most circumstances to
4. The principle of national treatment, at least until TRIPS (and even after, but obviously
thereafter only in a nominal and essentially meaningless way), is the very basis for all international
intellectual property conventions. Under this principle, each country is free to tailor the patent
regime it chooses, and its sole obligation is, therefore, to treat foreigners on par with nationals
(hence the principle of national treatment). It is recognized that "[b]ecause of the accepted territorial
nature of intellectual property rights, both [the Beme and Paris] Conventions relied largely upon a
'national treatment' standard to assure uniform protection." INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY 199, 205 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds., 1996) ("[T]he
Paris Convention grants each signatory country the right to determine what is patentable. This
means that each country creates its own specific intellecutal property regime.").
5. Prior to TRIPS, many, and perhaps even most, countries simply did not recognize the
patentability of pharmaceuticals. See infra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. Under TRIPS, patents
may not be excluded based on the field of technology, and most commentators assume-though
with no real factual or textual basis-that this means that pharmaceutical patenting is compulsory.
See infra Part III.
6. In a 1987 article, Professor A. Samuel Oddi listed forty-three countries, both developed
(seven countries) and undeveloped (thirty-six countries), that did "not protect pharmaceuticals." A.
Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 5
DUKE L.J. 831, 845 nn.68-69 (1987) (citing 2 J. BAXTER, WORLD PATENT LAW & PRACTICE, app. 2
(1987); U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNCTAD SECRETARIAT AND INT'L BUREAU OF
THE WIPO, THE ROLE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM IN THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 116 tbl. 14, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/19 (1974)). His list, however, did not include
China, which had no pharmaceutical protection. Patent Law of the People's Republic of China
(promulgated by the Fourth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's
Congress, Mar. 12, 1984), reprinted in 2C JOHN P. SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE
12-13 (1991). Professor Oddi also did not include Indonesia, which another article included in a list
of "problem countries," a list that included others countries on Oddi's list. J. Davidson Frame,
National Commitment to Intellectual Property Protection: An Empirical Investigation, 2 J.L. &
TECH. 209, 212 (1987). It is necessary to note that Davidson Frame's article was commissioned by
the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association at a time when that group was apparently
conducting a public relations campaign to publicize the fact that many countries were not coming on
board with the growing tide of pharmaceutical patent countries. Id. at 209; see Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The Need for Improved Patent
Protection Worldwide, 2 J.L. & TECH. 307, 311 (1987) (noting that "[1]ess developed countries often
prohibit [product patents] on pharmaceuticals"). Indeed, a recent WTO Secretariat Background Note
listed five more countries (Angola, Cuba, Madagascar, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates) not
included in the Oddi list which-as late as 1995-still excluded pharmaceuticals. JAYASHREE
WATAL, WORKSHOP ON DIFFERENTIAL PRICING AND FINANCING OF ESSENTIAL DRUGS 8 & n.4
(2001), available at http://www.wto.orgenglish/tratop_e/tripse/wtobackground-e.pdf. It is
difficult to explain these discrepancies, but one factor might have been the ambivalence that the
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mimic the patent regimes of the most advanced countries that alone-
because they have the infrastructure to develop and sell drugs to the
entire world-find it profitable to grant monopolies over pharmaceutical
products and methods (and to charge other nations-notably
undeveloped ones-tribute for access to this aspect of health care).
The crisis in health care, starting with HIV/AIDS, but not limited
only to that epidemic, has caused many less-developed countries to seek
an escape route from the oppressive demands of TRIPS.8 There are two
such paths. One is to grant compulsory licenses9 to domestic
manufacturers in order to achieve more affordable prices, pursuant to
major lobbyists-the pharmaceutical industry, for the most part-must have felt just prior to the
passage of TRIPS. On the one hand, identifying countries defying pharmaceutical patent protection
may have bolstered their claim that intellectual property was being "pirated." On the other hand, the
greater that number was, the less it could be said that they were defying an international norm. Thus,
it might have been to the advantage of the industry to list only those countries from which the
industry could gain a profit in the foreseeable future. Either way, of course, it is deceptive.
7. Many commentators have ascribed the historical and traditional reluctance to patent
pharmaceuticals only to undeveloped nations. As one commentator observed, "prohibitions on
patents for food, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals are not uncommon in the patent laws of developing
countries." David Ben Kay, The Patent Law of the People's Republic of China in Perspective, 33
UCLA L. REV. 331, 359 & n.141 (1985) (citing Gelatt, China's New Patent Law Needs
Clarification, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1984, at 6). But, the Oddi list (and the New Zealand and
Israeli litigation as only additional evidence, discussed infra Part IV) shows that this has not been
historically limited to one economic sector. See supra note 6.
8. See Sara M. Ford, Note, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPs Agreement:
Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 941, 963-66 (2000); Warren Kaplan &
Richard Laing, Local Production of Pharmaceuticals: Industrial Policy and Access to Medicines:
An Overview ofKey Concepts, Issues and Opportunities for Future Research, 1-2 (Health Nutrition
& Population, Discussion Paper, Paper No. 32036), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
extemal/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/B/2005/04/14/00009034120050414083224/Rendered
/PDF/320360KaplanLocalProductionFinal.pdf. Recent events reveal that several countries-
especially India, Brazil, and Cuba-are attempting to manufacture drugs despite patents held by
multinational corporations, and South Africa is attempting to compel licenses on a number of
expensive drugs patented by the multinationals. Kaplan & Laing, supra, at 13-16, 26-28; see also
Ford, supra, at 952-53.
9. For more on TRIPS and compulsory licenses on pharmaceuticals, see Carlos M. Correa,
Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for
Developing Countries 8-9, 19-20 (South Centre Trade-Related Agenda Development and Equity
Working Papers, Paper No. 5, 1999), available at http://www.iatp.org/files/
Intellectual PropertyRights_and the Use of Co.pdf. More information is available on
compulsory licenses in individual countries. For India, see Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen
Years: Success or Failure, as Measured by Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 390
(2011). For Canada, see generally Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary
Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical Perspective, Legal Framework Under TRIPS, and an
Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA (UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs & Sustainable
Dev., Issue Paper No. 5, 2003), available at http://ictsd.org/i/publications/1 1764/?view-details. For
South Africa, see Naomi A. Bass, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries:
Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L
L. REv. 191, 212-15 (2002).
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TRIPS Articles ("Article(s)") 3010 and 31,11 involving (at least if it is to
10. Article 30 states that "[m]embers may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties." Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 30, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
11. Article 31 states that:
[w]here the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent
without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third
parties authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected: (a)
authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits; (b) such use may
only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain
authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and
that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This
requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. In situations
of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall,
nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-
commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a patent search,
knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or
for the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly; (c) the scope and
duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized, and in
the case of semi-conductor technology shall only be for public non-commercial use or to
remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-
competitive; (d) such use shall be non-exclusive; (e) such use shall be non-assignable,
except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which enjoys such use; (f) any such
use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the
Member authorizing such use; (g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to
adequate protection of the legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to be
terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely
to recur. The competent authority shall have the authority to review, upon motivated
request, the continued existence of these circumstances; (h) the right holder shall be paid
adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the
economic value of the authorization; (i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the
authorization of such use shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review
by a distinct higher authority in that Member; (j) any decision relating to the
remuneration provided in respect of such use shall be subject to judicial review or other
independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member; (k) Members are not
obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such use is
permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be
anti-competitive. The need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into
account in determining the amount of remuneration in such cases. Competent authorities
shall have the authority to refuse termination of authorization if and when the conditions
which led to such authorization are likely to recur; (1) where such use is authorized to
permit the exploitation of a patent ("the second patent") which cannot be exploited
without infringing another patent ("the first patent"), the following additional conditions
shall apply: (i) the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an important
technical advance of considerable economic significance in relation to the invention
claimed in the first patent; (ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-
licence [sic] on reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in the second patent; and
(iii) the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non-assignable except with
the assignment of the second patent.
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be accomplished efficiently in a reasonable amount of time) the
declaration of a national emergency pursuant to Article 31(b).12 Vague in
its initial form, the WTO provided guidance to the interpretation and
application of Article 31 when it adopted the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health ("Doha Declaration").'3  It
acknowledged the need to recognize a sovereign nation's right to protect
public health, even at the expense of intellectual property rights.14 The
Doha Declaration affirmed a sovereign nation's authority to grant
compulsory licenses during national emergencies, and to define what
constitutes a national emergency.'5 A country that was suffering a major
epidemic could compel licensure for domestic production of patented
medication that they could not otherwise afford.
Many countries, including South Africa, chose this route, seeking
compulsory licenses on various pharmaceuticals (even though, in the
end, compulsory licenses involve payments to the patent holder, with
TRIPS not providing a specific method of calculation).16 In a baffling
development, however, then-President Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki of South
Africa refused to declare the national emergency that may in fact be a
prerequisite to the granting of such compulsory licenses without
intolerable delays.'7 Mbeki stated that "[t]he incidence is persuasive in
itself... [a]ccordingly, we do not need to declare a national emergency
to underscore the point."" Why the South Africans chose a route that
requires a declaration of emergency for compulsory licenses to be
Id. art. 31 (footnote omitted).
12. For the text of Article 31(b), see supra note 11.
13. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
14. Id
15. Id.
16. James Packard Love, Recent Examples of the Use of Compulsory Licenses on Patents,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L, Mar. 2007, at 1, 9-18, available at http://www.keionline.org/misc-
docs/recent cls.pdf; Ford, supra note 8, at 952-53; see also supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
As the WTO cautioned at the "WHO/WTO Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of
Essential Drugs" conference in Norway:
[T]he grounds on which this can be done are not limited by the Agreement, but the
Agreement contains a number of conditions that have to be met in order to safeguard the
legitimate interests of the patent owner. There is not space to discuss all of these here,
but two of the main such conditions are that, as a general rule, an effort must first have
been made to obtain a voluntary licence [sic] on reasonable commercial terms and
conditions and that the remuneration paid to the right holder shall be adequate in the
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the licence
[sic] ....
WATAL, supra note 6, at annex 26.
17. Rachel L. Swains, No National Emergency, South African Leader Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
15, 2001, at A14.
18. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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implemented in a reasonable time, but were unwilling to make that
declaration, is inexplicable, especially because another route was and is
available. That route does not require a declaration of national
emergency and, furthermore, does not require the payment of any
royalties. That route is described in Article 27(3)(a).19
Before addressing the blanket advantage offered by Article
27(3)(a), note that also, as part of the Doha Declaration, for WTO
members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector facing difficulties in making effective use of
compulsory licensing, WTO members decided, in 2003, on a "waiver"
that removed limitations on exports under compulsory licenses to least-
developed country Members and other Members that have insufficient or
no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the patented
product in question.20 Subsequently, India protested against the seizure
of generic drugs exported by Indian pharmaceutical companies to
destinations abroad via European ports.21 India argued before the TRIPS
Council that the widespread and repeated seizures, under the European
Council Regulation 1383, had an adverse systemic impact on the
principle of universal access to medicines, national public health
budgets, legitimate trade of generic medicines, and also seriously
impaired the efforts of civil society organizations engaged in providing
medicines and improving public health in the least-developed parts of
the world.22 Under the later Hong Kong Declaration and related WTO
decisions, including the decision to make permanent some provisions of
the Doha Declaration which favored poor countries with waivers, the
WTO seems to constantly wave candy before the least-developed and
developing world, and then take the candy away.2 3 Most recently, the
19. Article 27(3)(a) reads: "Members may also exclude from patentability ... diagnostic,
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals . . . ." TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 10, art. 27(3)(a).
20. See Justin Erickson, Note, Call for Reform: Analyzing TRIPS Through European Seizure
of Generic Medication, 21 MINN. J. INT'L L. 382, 395 (2012).
21. See id. at 388-91.
22. Id. at 390-91.
23. See id. at 386-87. For more on the Hong Kong Declaration, see, for example, Daniel
Benoliel & Bruno Salama, Towards an Intellectual Property Bargaining Theory: The Post-WTO
Era, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 265, 338-64 (2010). For one of the most recent discussions of the waivers
(which were due to expire in 2013) offered to poor countries, see, for example, Jennifer M.
Champagne, Access to Essential Medicines in Developing Countries: The Role of International
Intellectual Property Law & Policy in the Access Crisis, 22 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 75, 92 (2012).
Champagne states:
In 2005, the WTO approved the changes to the TRIPS Agreement proposed by the
Paragraph 6 Waiver .... The deadline for these changes to be formally accepted by two-
thirds of the WTO and built into the TRIPS Agreement was extended from December
2011 to December 2013. However, since the acceptance of the Paragraph 6 Waiver, the
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waivers that were set to expire for the least-developed nations were
extended once more, this time until 2021.24 A large part of these waivers
would be unnecessary and cost-free, if those countries were to exercise
their rights to exclude pharmaceutical processes under Article 27(3)(a).
Additionally, many countries, including India, Thailand, and others,
have recently been the focus of heated discussions in this area.25 Using
the "to promote access to medicine for all" aspect of the Doha
Declaration as a basis for the decision, India issued a compulsory license
for the cancer drug, sorafenib tosylate (sold under the brand name
"Nexavar") in March 2012, on the grounds that the drug "was not
available to the public at a reasonably affordable price."2 6 Bayer
implementation of compulsory licensing by developing countries has been almost non-
existent. Furthermore, post-TRIPS and the Paragraph 6 Waiver, cost and access to
affordable essential medicines remains a crucial problem in developing countries, as
indicated by the continued inability of developing countries to provide proper access to
antiretroviral therapy for HIV/AIDS patients.
Id. For the text of the 2005 extension, see Council for the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed
Country Members, IP/C/40 (Nov. 30, 2005).
24. Council for the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the
Transition Period Under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, IP/C/64 (June 12,
2013). For a discussion of the decision, see, for example, Poorest WTO Countries Granted New
TRIPS Extension, INT'L CTR. TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 13, 2013),
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges-africa/167516.
25. See, e.g., Hearing on U.S.-India Trade Relations: Opportunities and Challenges: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th Cong. 13-14 (2013)
(statement of Roy Waldron, Senior Vice President and Chief Intellectual Property Counsel, Pfizer)
[hereinafter Hearing on U.S. -India Trade Relations]; Thomas C. Berg, Intellectual Property and the
Preferential Option for the Poor, 5 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 193, 195-96 (2008). Thomas Berg
states:
A 2003 decision of the TRIPS General Council permitted exports of generic drugs to the
poorest nations under compulsory licenses in order to address the grave public-health
problems. But to many critics, that step was insufficient because the process it
implements is too cumbersome and excludes some highly effective drugs. More recently,
the application of TRIPS's full IP-protection obligations to India, whose generic industry
was the largest, has raised questions of whether sufficient supplies of low-cost drugs will
continue to be produced. Finally, the TRIPS mechanisms for authorizing generic drugs
have been sidestepped through bilateral agreements under which nations like the U.S.
require their poorer trading partners to give stronger, 'TRIPS-plus,' protection to
intellectual property.
Berg, supra, at 195-96 (footnotes omitted). Whether TRIPS-plus is itself a TRIPS violation is
unresolved, but it is surely dishonest.
26. See In re Natco Pharma Ltd. & Bayer Corp., C.L.A. No. I of 2011, at 1, 20-24, 35-36
(2012), available at http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/compulsory license_12032012.pdf. It is
important to note that although this case does not explicitly reference the Doha Declaration, it
indirectly relied upon the "to promote access to medicine for all" aspect of the Doha Declaration
when utilizing section 83(7)(a)(ii) of the Patent Act of 1970-which states that a compulsory license
may be issued if the "reasonable requirements of the public" have not been met-to reach its
decision.
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Corporation, which holds the patent for the drug, challenged the validity
of the issuance.27 Its appeal to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board
to issue a stay on the license was dismissed in September 2012.28 In the
meantime, the government of India has indicated its desire to increase its
use of compulsory licenses in the long term.29 India has issued licenses,
or is in the process of doing so, with respect o at least four cancer drugs,
including Nexavar.3 0
Furthermore, although the drug companies have mounted what
appears to be fierce resistance 3 1 (although even this is uncertain in view
of their recent concessions) to the developing countries' attempts to
compel Article 31 compulsory licenses, they may be shedding what
amounts to only crocodile tears. The fact is that Article 31 compulsory
licenses still require the payment of "adequate remuneration."32 Thus,
the pharmaceutical companies will still be able to demand and receive
what is found to be their moneys' worth. If, however, developing
countries were to simply declare that therapeutic method patents are
simply not recognized, the pharmaceutical companies could demand
nothing, and these countries would be free to practice these inventions
without any intellectual property consequences (because no patents
would be granted for these innovations, no royalties could be claimed).
Taking this step undoubtedly may lead the developing countries to
create some conflict in the international political arena. However, the
commotion created is no greater than issuance of compulsory licenses
under the reasonable affordability banner. The fear of many such
developing and less-developed countries that such takings show a lack of
respect for intellectual property rights, and consequently, decay trade
relations, seem unwarranted.3 3
27. Divya Rajagopal, Bayer Petition Against Natco Over Manufacture of Nexavar Dismissed,
ECON. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2012, 10:27 PM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-09-
16/news/33880177_1_nexavar-cancer-drug-compulsory-license.
28. Id.
29. See Naval Satarawala Chopra & Dinoo Muthappa, The Curious Case of Compulsory
Licensing in India, COMPETITION L. INT'L, Aug. 2012, at 34, 35-39 (discussing the impact of Natco
Pharma Ltd v. Bayer Corp, Application No. 1/2011, on the enforcement of India's competition
legislation).
30. Hearing on U.S.-India Trade Relations, supra note 25, at 13-14.
31. See, e.g., Uchd Ewelukwa, Patent Wars in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: The
Pharmaceutical Industry, Ethics, and Global Trade, 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 203, 240-77 (2005).
32. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31(h) ("[T]he right holder shall be paid adequate
remuneration in the circumstances of each case.").
33. For an additional analysis of the interplay between regimes of national and international
property law protection, see, for example, Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82
IND. L.J. 827, 856-72 (2007).
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II. SOME NECESSARY PATENT BASICS ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
METHOD AND PRODUCT PATENTS
Article 27(3)(a) cannot be understood unless some very basic patent
law, regarding the distinction between method and product patents, is
mastered. Patent law, at all times and in all places, has always covered
only two kinds of possible inventions: (1) those involving new things or
products; and (2) those involving new ways of doing things or
methods.34 There are, thus, product patents and method patents. Method
patents are also called "process patents" or "use patents," but these terms
simply are interchangeable with method patents, and help
describe one of the only two kinds of inventions eligible for patent
protection: (1) things (products); and (2) ways of doing things (methods,
processes, or uses).35
The distinction between product and method patents raises more
than issues of simple terminology because the possibility of gaining a
process patent, instead of a product patent, has extraordinary
consequences. The most important of these is that, while a product
patent can only be acquired by one who invents something that never
existed before, a method patent can be acquired by one who involves old
and well-known things.36 This is because the things or products are not
what is invented. Instead, the way of using the invention is the arguably
patentable innovation.
For instance, one can obtain a patent on a chemical only if that
chemical was never known before. But, especially in the pharmaceutical
area, it remains possible even with very old and well-known chemicals
to gain a patent (a twenty-year or more monopoly) on a new way of
using an old substance. One of the most notorious examples of this is, in
fact, an AIDS-related discovery: that of azidothymidine ("AZT"). AZT
was invented in the 1960s and, by the time its use for AIDS was
discovered, it had long passed the point of having any patentable life as a
product.37 But, the discovery of AZT's effectiveness against HIV
allowed the Burroughs-Wellcome Company to file dozens of new patent
applications covering all sorts of uses and dosages of AZT for the AIDS
epidemic.38 Not being patents on the product, they were the stereotypical
method patents-therapeutic methods.
34. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 27(1).
35. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b), 101 (2012).
36. See, e.g., § 100(b) (defining "process" as a "process, art or method ... includ[ing] a new
use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material").
37. For more on the patent history of AZT, see, for example, Evan Ackiron, Note, Patents for
Critical Pharmaceuticals: The AZT Case, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 156-59, 166-69 (1991).
38. Id. at 167.
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A pharmaceutical manufacturer would always prefer a product
patent because that prevents anybody else from using that product,
without permission, in any way for any purpose for twenty years. But, a
twenty-year patent on the particular use of a chemical-especially one
that has no other use (like AZT)-is frequently as effective as a patent
on the product itself. And often, it is even more effective, in an important
sense, because of the process of "evergreening," by which unscrupulous
pharmaceutical manufacturers file additional uses for drugs whose
patents are imminently expiring-thus triggering an additional twenty-
year period for each use, extending the effective patent term of the
underlying drug.
An understanding of "Swiss claims" concepts and similarly evasive
claim drafting techniques is also essential. A pure Swiss claim over, say,
product X, takes the form of "use of X for the manufacture of a medicine
to treat Y." 40 In Europe, the first use (usually medical) of a known
product (protected by a product patent) is patentable by the use of a
purpose-limited-product claim.4 ' Though not a pure Swiss claim, it
achieves the same purpose: avoiding any bar against the patent of a
therapeutic use or process. Other uses of the same substance can be
patented provided the claims are directed to the use of the substance.4 2 A
Swiss claim would assert a patent not over the drug or over the
therapeutic use, but instead over the manufacturing process, even though
there is neither novelty nor non-obviousness involved in the
manufacturing.43 Thus, the novelty for such items lies in the new use,
without taking into consideration whether the pharmaceutical was
previously known. Therefore, Swiss claims are equivalent to method
patents, and that method is a therapeutic use. Moreover, "[p]atent
applications over the therapeutic use of a known product essentially are
instructions to the physician about how to employ a certain substance to
treat a particular disease. Such a new use, hence, is equivalent to a
method of therapeutic treatment. . . ."44
39. See MICHIE I. HUNT, PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS: FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE
INDUSTRY 46 (BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD ASS'N 2000).
40. Carlos M. Correa, Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing Countries, 3 TUL.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 15 n.58 (2001).
41. SRIVIDHYA RAGAVAN, PATENT AND TRADE DISPARITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 156
(2012).
42. Id
43. UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 357 (2005).
44. Id.
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III. THE CONFUSION OVER TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ARTICLE 27(3)(A)
As it turns out, TRIPS allows member countries to exclude entirely
from their patent systems therapeutic methods for the treatment of
humans.4 5 A patent over the therapeutic use of a chemical-the very
definition of a pharmaceutical-need not, under Article 27(3)(a), be
granted by any TRIPS member.
Why, then, do TRIPS members persist in recognizing these patents,
and why have so many developing and least-developed nations, like
South Africa and India, foregone this route and attempted-rather half-
heartedly, as it turns out-to impose compulsory licenses, with their
requirement of adequate remuneration, instead? The answer seems to be
that most experts have not fully understood the import of Article
27(3)(a), because they do not understand the difference between method
and product patents.
The history of Article 27(3)(a), while not as well documented (an
unfortunate characteristic of WTO, GATT, and TRIPS provisions
generally)46 as most domestic U.S. legislation, is not very complicated,
and it is clear that those who drafted it did not want the exclusion of
method patents to embrace product patents as well. In fact, early drafts
retained a qualification, apparently borrowed from the European Patent
Convention, excepting from the therapeutic method exclusion the
45. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 27(3)(a).
46. LARs ANELL, Foreword to GERVAIS, supra note 1, at viii (1998) [hereinafter ANELL,
Foreword] ("[T]he essential part of the deliberations were informal. There is no record of the oral
arguments made. The history of the negotiations is only reflected in the numerous versions of the
Chairman's draft."). Daniel Gervais has written that:
[T]here is no record of the most important part of the deliberations, the informal sessions
during which progress was made on successive versions of the Chairman's text... .The
only traceable evidence of the emergence of TRIPS, apart from the brief notes on the
monthly formal meetings where the exact wording was seldom discussed, are the
Chairman's texts, some ofwhich have been de-restricted.
GERVAIS, TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at ix (emphasis added). This is unfortunate, however,
only in the sense that U.S. law values legislative history. With respect to international agreements,
however, resort to legislative history or "travaux preparatoires" is not encouraged. See Maria
Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J.
INT'L L. 281, 332-38 (1988). This probably means, however, that traditional legislative history in
the form of comments and testimony is excluded whereas the actual development of textual
material, in the form of early drafts, is generally considered. See infra note 47 and accompanying
text. That much of the legislative history does not even exist, however, it is certainly not
encouraging from the American perspective, and becomes unsettling in view of the fact that the
restriction of what remains receives, at best, sanguine acceptance. It cannot be ignored that Anell
was the Chairman, and that only some of the texts which he oversaw, according to Gervais, have
been made available.
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products used in those methods.4 7 This seems to be due to a sentiment
that discoverers of wholly new chemicals might merit a patent, whereby
those who simply found new uses for existing chemicals might be less
deserving. For instance, the European Patent Convention language is
similar to Article 27(3)(a), but expressly qualifies it by saying, "[t]his
provision shall not apply to products, in particular substances or
compositions, for use in any of these methods."4 8 Note that this clearly
does not include the method. Even some commentators who are not
favorably inclined towards pharmaceutical patents generally agree that
Article 27(3)(a) does not mean to exempt products used in these methods
and processes: under Article 27(3)(a), "[t]he exclusion . . . correctly
interpreted, would not apply either to any apparatus used for diagnostics
or treatment or to products . . . ."49 But, it bears noting that this is true, of
course, only if those products are separately patentable as inventive
products. Under no circumstances would it be argued that the exclusion
from patentability coupled with the exception reserving the possibility of
product patentability somehow renders patentable those products which
are not, in and of themselves, inventive.
Indeed, the WTO itself continues to demand that while therapeutic
methods may be excluded from patentability, this exclusion does not, or
should not, cover the products used in these methods.50 Thus, in response
to questions by a WTO panel, a French legislative group explained that
its Article 27(3)(a) exclusion was limited, saying, "[t]his exclusion does
not apply to products (notably substances or compositions) which are
necessary in order to implement one of these methods[]" (again
reserving for exclusion of the methods themselves)."
But, this insistence that Article 27(3)(a)'s exclusion does not cover
the products used in the excluded processes has been hopelessly
47. See GERVAIS, TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 334-36, 350-53. As noted above,
legislative history is not normally considered when interpreting WTO documents such as TRIPS.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Legislative history in that sense, however, does not seem
to include the various earlier drafts of the particular text-drafts which are apparently routinely
consulted in doubtful areas. GERVAIS, TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at ix ("It has been a
constant practice in 'GATT law' to consider the evolution of a text as one of the elements to
understand its meaning, where this is not entirely clear.").
48. Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52(4), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255.
49. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 231
(Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusefeds., 2d ed. 2008).
50. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 67 (2000).
51. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Review of Legislation
in the Fields of Patents, Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits, Protection of
Undisclosed Information and Control ofAnti-Competitive Practices in Contractual Licenses, § 111.2,
IP/Q3/FRA/I (Feb. 4, 1998).
196 HOFSTRA LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 43:185
EXCLUDING PATENTABILITY
confused and misunderstood by most, if not all, commentators. It is one
thing to say that a patentable product should be eligible for potential
patent protection even if the methods utilizing it may not. It is quite
another to misunderstand this exclusion so entirely as to conclude that
any product used in an excluded method can somehow be protected by
patent law, irrespective of its own patentability. In fact, it is the failure to
understand that method and product patents are different, which explains
why some commentators have failed to understand that Article 27(3)(a)
is a viable means by which a country can exclude therapeutic method
patents from coverage, even if patentable products nevertheless remain,
as the WTO seems to insist, fully protected. Or, more importantly, an
otherwise patentable process may be excluded and, even though Article
27(3)(a) does not exclude any associated products, if the products are not
patentable on their own (that is, if they do not satisfy the traditional
patent requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, and utility), nothing
patentable remains.
Consider, for instance, one recent commentary piece that discusses
the Article 27(3)(a) exclusion. The author states:
This is intended to facilitate the dissemination of innovations in
medical treatment methods; it does not condone a refusal to patent
pharmaceuticals. This is certain because Article 70(8) requires member
countries to set up a means of collecting applications for
pharmaceutical patents, and if pharmaceuticals were excluded under
this exception that requirement would be nonsensical.52
But, this author is clearly wrong if he means that pharmaceutical
method patents as well as product patents are not excluded when they are
the very focus of the exclusion. This passage appears not to understand
the distinction between method and product patents.53 Of course, the
argument does not even address the method/product distinction. It is
entirely possible for Article 70(8) to be fully respected, and for
pharmaceutical product patent applications to be collected, filed, and
granted, while at the same time therapeutic method patents are
excluded from a patent regime. All that are excluded are the method
patents (even though they may be pharmaceutical in character), not the
52. George K. Foster, Comment, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent
Protection. The U.S. and India in the Uraguay Round and Its Aftermath, 3 UCLA . INT'L L. &
FOREIGN. AFF. 283, 290 (1998).
53. The comment received an award for being the best comment of the year, showing that this
ignorance of fine distinctions in patent law is not only widespread, but also not a bar to excellence.
Id. at 283. It is, however, fatal to understanding how poor nations can escape the oppressive hold of
the worst aspects of the TRIPS accord.
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product patents. That assumes, of course, that the product is
independently patentable.
One objection to treating Article 27(3)(a) as a blanket provision
allowing for the exclusion of all pharmaceutical method patents seems to
be that, in some metaphysical, or even psychoanalytical sense, the
drafters never really intended this to apply to therapies involving
products, as well. But, this is contradicted by the history of this language
(in which it is accompanied by qualifications excepting the products
used in these methods from the exclusion)S4 expressly recognizing, for
example, that the excluded methods do, or at least might, involve use of
pharmaceuticals, including patentable ones. Legal language is generally
interpreted not by the secret intentions of its drafters, but by the plain
meaning of its words.5 And the fact that this language is
traditionally accompanied by provisions clearly excepting from its
exclusion the products used in connection with these methods makes it
clear that, in fact, this provision does contemplate methods which are
used in conjunction with products-in other words, pharmaceutical
method patents.
Alternative interpretations of the therapeutic method exclusion are
difficult to sustain. One might imagine that the drafters really intended to
exclude only those manipulative methods associated with unpatentability
and other activities to which there was traditionally free access, such as
chiropractic procedures or acupuncture, or methods of examination or
even surgery (an area that was traditionally excluded from patent law but
that has recently been the object of patent protection).56 But, Article
54. See GERVAIS, TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 334-36. For a history of TRIPS, see
generally GERVAIS, TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note I and INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 1.
55. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park
and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265-67 (1981); John Paul
Stevens, Essay, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1373, 1374
(1992). TRIPS is apparently subject to Article 3.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. Article 3.2 specifies that the purpose of a dispute
settlement is to clarify the provisions of the WTO Agreements "in accordance with customary rules
of interpretation of public international law," which in turn imposes traditional rules of international
law with regard to textual construction. Id. art. 3.2. The Vienna Convention, therefore, seems to
govern. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Its
rules of construction for international accords, at least with respect to the interpretation of the
phrases with which we are concerned here, are basically the same as the rules traditionally applied
to domestic U.S. legislation. Article 31.1 provides that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose." Id. art. 31.1. Article 31.4 provides that "[a] special meaning
shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended." Id. art. 31.4.
56. For a discussion of what could be excluded, see Correa, supra note 40, at 16-17.
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27(3)(a) specifically mentions diagnostic and surgical methods in
addition to therapeutic methods, so that, under traditional rules of legal
textual construction, therapeutic methods must be separate and apart
from those two areas. In addition, if tradition is the measure, then it
must be noted that pharmaceutical method patents have been excluded
traditionally from the patent regimes of many states. If anything is
addressed by the therapeutic methods excluded by Article 27(3)(a), it
would seem drug therapies are the prime candidate (especially because
of the qualification that products used in conjunction with these
therapeutic methods may not be excluded).
But, there seems to be an undeniable tendency to view treatment
methods in physical-rather than pharmaceutical-terms. It is quite
probable that many believe, however wrongly, that "therapeutic
methods" are somehow limited to such manipulative, tangible,
procedures akin to surgery and diagnosis, even though TRIPS addresses
those separately. One note vigorously opposed the granting of "medical
process" patents, objecting as it did to recent patents over embryo
transfers.59 In its concentration upon-and almost visceral objection to-
patents over such physical methods, it ignored, somewhat
characteristically it seems, the intimate overlap of such patents with
pharmaceuticals. The note, for instance, never once employed the word
"pharmaceutical." Paradoxically, although it did not recognize that
pharmaceutical method patents are themselves medical process patents,
it did discuss Wellcome Foundation, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Patents,6 0
which it characterized as "a long and well-researched opinion."6 That
1983 New Zealand Court of Appeals opinion addressed a patent office
decision that the new use of an old chemical, though indeed a medical
process (processes which theretofore had been considered unpatentable),
was nevertheless patentable.62 The New Zealand Court of Appeals
reversed that patent office determination, leaving the premise that it was
indeed a medical process untouched, instead basing its decision on its
57. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 27(3)(a). The universal rule of statutory
construction is that words are to be interpreted so as to avoid rendering any of them surplusage. See,
e.g., Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990); Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988); United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372-75 (1988). To the extent this represents customary
international practice as well, TRIPS should be interpreted in the same manner. See supra notes 46-
47, 54 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
59. Gregory F. Burch, Note, Ethical Considerations in the Patenting of Medical Processes, 65
TEx. L. REV. 1139, 1152-61 (1987).
60. [1983] NZLR 385 (CA).
61. Burch, supra note 59, at 1164.
62. Wellcome Found. Ltd, [1983] NZLR, at 385-86.
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view that such patents were unethical.63 The principle that the use of a
drug is in fact a medical process was, therefore, recognized explicitly
and implicitly in both proceedings.
And, indeed, the language used by pharmaceutical manufacturers in
their own patent applications compels the conclusion that "therapeutic
methods" means pharmaceutical methods. Because pharmaceutical
companies routinely describe their drug method patents-in the very
patent documents they file-as "therapeutic methods."64 It would be
difficult to deny, therefore, that therapeutic methods mean exactly what
the drug companies say they are: pharmaceutical processes involving
drugs which may or may not be separately patentable aside from the
processes themselves.
To illustrate, we originally looked at the top five pharmaceutical
companies worldwide and their method patent activity over the last thirty
years. Looking at Pfizer, which is listed as the assignee in approximately
2791 U.S. patents that claim, as inventive, a method for achieving a
particular result, 1271 (45.46%) of those patents specifically describe the
method using the words "therapeutic" or "therapy."6 5 Similarly, Roche is
63. Id. at 391-92.
64. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,859,021 (filed Feb. 22, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,733,915 (filed
Mar. 30, 1995).
65. These results were generated with a Lexis search of all utility patents since 1983 through
1991 for: (1) "Assignee(company) and method for" designed to discover virtually all method
patents; and (2) "Assignee(company) and method for and therap! w/25 (method or procedure or
process)" to discover those method patents which described the invention in terms of a derivative of
the root "therap." Clearly there is some error here, as not all method patents use the term "method
for" in their claims, and the words "therapy" or "therapeutic" along with the words "method,"
"procedure," or "process," may be found in a part of the patent document other than that describing
the invention at issue. But, the risks of overinclusion, as well as underinclusion, may well balance
out, and it seems to be a highly realistic way of discovering the relevant information. The search
was conducted again on March 4, 2013, with similar results, yielding an average of 39.35% holding
method patents described as therapeutic or a variation thereof, using Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer,
GlaxoSmithKline, Roche, and Sanofi-Aventis. We also took a similar look at a few predominantly
high-tech companies, many involving genetic engineering. The results were, again, similar. These
companies (Novo Nordisk, Amgen, Gilead Sciences, Biogen Idec, and Teva) held method patents
that used the word therapeutic, or a variation, within 25 words of method, use, or process, on
average, in 59% of their method patents. The range was from 25% (Novo Nordisk) to 79%
(Amgen). Pfizer Utility Patents From 1983 to 2013 Search Results, LExIsNExIs,
http://www.lexis.com (follow "Legal" hyperlink; then follow "Area of Law - By Topic" hyperlink;
then follow "Patent Law" hyperlink; then follow "Find Patents" hyperlink; then follow "Utility
Patents" hyperlink; then enter "Assignee(pfizer) and method for"; then select "From 01/01/1983 To
03/04/2013"; then follow "Search" hyperlink); Pfizer Utility Patents Using a Derivative of the Word
"Therap" from 1983 to 2013 Search Results, LEXIsNExIs, http://www.lexis.com (follow "Legal"
hyperlink; then follow "Area of Law - By Topic" hyperlink; then follow "Patent Law" hyperlink;
then follow "Find Patents" hyperlink; then select "Utility Patents"; then enter "Assignee(Pfizer) and
method for and therap! w/25 (method or procedure or process); then select "From 01/01/1983 To
3/4/2013"; then follow "Search" hyperlink).
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identified as the assignee of approximately 4128 method patents, of
which 1704 (41.28%) describe the invention in those terms. In other
words, on average, a majority of the pharmaceutical companies
themselves significantly describe these patents in terms that characterize
them as therapeutic methods. These traditional companies, of course,
routinely patent pharmaceutical products as well as pharmaceutical
methods, so that one might expect a large proportion of their patents to
address only products, and thus, use these terms less often.
Biotechnological companies, on the other hand, dealing with biologics
which are more often unpatentable natural substances, involve a higher
proportion of purely method applications of genetically engineered
materials, and unsurprisingly describe their inventions even more
frequently as therapeutic methods. Amgen, for instance, received
approximately 1188 method patents in which 938 (78.96%) used terms
similar or identical to the words "therapeutic methods;"6 7 in fact, Pfizer
expressly describes 104 pharmaceutical patents as "therapeutic
methods."68 For the biotechs, Amgen expressly describes 122 as
therapeutic methods.6 9 Thus, the argument that a therapeutic method,
in the sense Article 27(3)(a) uses it, does not encompass the use
of pharmaceuticals in health care, simply does not wash.
The pharmaceutical companies themselves routinely admit this in their
own patents.
Indeed, it is not only in their pharmaceutical patents that the drug
manufacturers admit that therapeutic methods include pharmaceuticals,
but also in their public relations. Gerald Mossinghoff, president of the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association admitted, perhaps
inadvertently, exactly the same thing in a 1987 article apparently
designed to support international pressure to expand pharmaceutical
66. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
68. Pfizer Utility Patents Using the Term "Theraputic Method" From 1983 to 2013 Search
Results, LEXIsNExIs http://www.lexis.com (follow "Legal" hyperlink; then follow "Area of Law -
By Topic" hyperlink; then follow "Patent Law" hyperlink; then follow "Find Patents" hyperlink;
then select "Utility Patents" hyperlink; then enter "assignee(Pfizer) and 'theraputic method"'; then
select "From 01/01/1983 To 03/04/2013"; then follow "Search" hyperlink); see, e.g., U.S. Patent
No. 5,859,021 col. 4 1. 9-16 (filed Feb. 22, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,733,915, col. 2 1. 27-35 (filed
Mar. 30, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,627,186 col. 4 1. 4-11 (filed Mar. 28, 1994).
69. Amgen Utility Patents Using the Term "Theraputic Method" From 1983 to 2013 Search
Results, LEXIsNEXIs http:www.lexis.com (follow "Legal" hyperlink; then follow "Area of Law - By
Topic" hyperlink; then follow "Patent Law" hyperlink; then follow "Find Patents" hyperlink; then
select "Utility Patents" hyperlink; then enter "assignee(Amgen) and 'theraputic method'; then
select "From 01/01/1983 To 03/04/2013"; then follow "Search" hyperlink). There is of course an
error rate similar to that described above. See supra note 65.
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patents through the adoption of TRIPS.70 Additionally, "[i]n a limited
number of foreign nations, a method of use patent is available when a
new use is discovered for an old compound," Mossinghoff lamented, but
then observed, "[a] method of use claim is often available in nations in
which a method for the treatment of the human body is patentable."7 In
other words, despite the general bar in many countries against
pharmaceutical patents, a method patent might nevertheless succeed, but
only if human body treatments were allowed, making it clear that
pharmaceutical method patents are in fact therapeutic treatment methods.
The industry was clearly willing to characterize pharmaceutical
method patents as treatment methods when it would help them evade a
bar against pharmaceutical patents generally. One cannot help
wondering whether it will nevertheless answer the argument that Article
27(3)(a) covers pharmaceutical methods by denying that they are
methods of treatment.
Others, besides the drug industry itself, have also recognized that
pharmaceutical method patents are included within therapeutic methods
or "methods for the treatment of diseases." Another 1987 article, in
lamenting that Chinese patent law "contains certain deficiencies in the
pharmaceutical and agrichemical areas," identified the pharmaceutical
"deficiencies" as the exclusion from the Chinese Patent Act of "methods
for the treatment of diseases," thus adopting the argument that treatment
methods inherently include pharmaceutical methods.72
IV. JUDICIAL DECISIONS EQUATING THERAPEUTIC METHODS WITH
PHARMACEUTICAL METHOD PATENTS
As mentioned earlier, the New Zealand courts have characterized
pharmaceutical method patents as "therapeutic."73  In Wellcome
Foundation Ltd., the Court of Appeals considered "a method of treating
or preventing meningeal leukemia or neoplasms in the brain of man or
other mammal by the use of known compounds (such as
methodichlorophen and ethodichlorophen, known respectively as
metoprine and etoprine)," a classically pharmaceutical patent not unlike
that over the use of AZT or stavudine ("D4T") for HIV infection.74 At
various places throughout the opinion, the judges referred to the
70. See generally Mossinghoff, supra note 6.
71. Id.at3ll.
72. Harvey J. Winter, The Role of the United States Government in Improving International
Intellectual Property Protection, 2 J.L. & TECH. 325, 330 & n.35 (1987).
73. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
74. Comm'r ofPatents v. Wellcome Found Ltd [1983] NZLR 385 (CA).
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invention as one that involves a "therapeutic use," a "therapeutic drug,"
and a "therapeutic treatment."75
In Wellcome Foundation Ltd v. Plantex Ltd.,7 the Israeli High
Court referred to a pharmaceutical method patent as a "therapeutic
treatment.,77 As this 1974 case and the 1983 New Zealand case were
apparently well-known cases, and both predate the adoption of TRIPS, it
would be difficult to sustain any argument that the words "therapeutic
method" did not clearly include pharmaceutical method patents at the
time TRIPS was adopted.
V. THE PROBLEM OF SWISS AND Swiss-TYPE EVASIVE CLAIMS
Despite the fact that, as has been discussed here, it is fairly clear-
in fact, extremely clear-that developing countries (and others as well,
of course) can avoid the patenting of therapeutic pharmaceutical patents
and still be TRIPS-compliant; this will surely not be accepted by the
international pharmaceutical industry sector. One way they have
already managed to avoid bars against the patentability of
pharmaceuticals in countries that have traditionally opposed such patents
is by Swiss claims or variations thereof.79 But, any country that is
committed enough to adopt the position advocated in this Article should
easily pierce the ethereally gossamer veil behind which those claims
evade the therapeutic exclusion. It is, in a sense, all done with mirrors.
The true Swiss claim effectively (that is, in countries that legitimize
it, notably Switzerland) covers therapeutic pharmaceutical uses by
claiming the manufacturing process (and, thus, not the therapeutic
process) that produces the therapeutic drug.80 The Swiss formula and its
variants either attempt o patent a use of a product by nominally claiming
the product, even though it is usually unpatentable as such (because, if it
were, they would certainly seek the far more powerful product patent),
or they shift the focus of the use on the manufacture, while in reality
covering the therapeutic use.
75. See generally id.
76. CA [1973] RPC 514.
77. Id. at 539.
78. See supra Part HI.
79. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
80. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 43, at 357.
81. Id.
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The 'Swiss formula'.. . concerns the patenting of the use of the
product, thus a method, and not a product.
-United Nations Conference on Trade and Development82
The variants of a pure Swiss claim fall into the category of "second
indication" patents, which allow a patent over later-discovered
therapies.83 These types of claims are allowed, even where therapeutic
processes are prohibited, by interpreting them to be product claims.8 4
Such an interpretation is surely "nonsensical."
VI. CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EXCLUSION OF
THERAPEUTIC METHODS FROM PATENTABILITY
If a country that excludes therapeutic methods from patentability
must still respect pharmaceutical product patents, has it gained any
effective advantage? The answer to that is a resounding and profound
yes. This is so for the simple reason that although some therapeutic
method patents involve independently-patentable pharmaceutical
products, many therapeutic method patents involve well-known and old
chemicals that are not, in and of themselves, eligible for patent
protection.86 It turns out, in fact, that many, and perhaps a majority of,
the most important pharmaceutical patents useful in treating the most
expensive and threatening diseases, such as malaria, tuberculosis, and
AIDS, are only method patents, not product patents. AZT and D4T, for
instance, are purely method patents.87 They are exactly what Article
27(3)(a) contemplates: therapeutic methods for the treatment of humans
that just happen to involve unpatentable products. Any country can
exclude these therapeutic methods from patentability and, unlike an
Article 31 compulsory license, need not pay one cent for the
practice of these therapies.88 And, since the products themselves-AZT
and D4T-are not, and cannot be, patented in any country, they
can be freely manufactured by the least expensive generic drug
manufacturer available.
82. Id. (partial emphasis added).
83. Id. at 356-57.
84. Id. at 387.
85. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. George Foster used the word "nonsensical" to
describe the fairly obvious conclusion that Article 27(3)(a) allows the exclusion of pharmaceuticals
as therapeutic methods.
86. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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EXCLUDING PATENTABILITY
And, of course, it is not just AZT and D4T, but a host of other
pharmaceutical therapies that are at stake here. Most pharmaceuticals
under patent are not patented as products, but as new methods of using
old and well-known drugs. All of those patents, constituting perhaps the
bulk of useful new therapies,89 can be excluded from the patent regime
of any country wishing to conserve its limited health care resources.
The failure to understand that Article 27(3)(a) truly includes
therapeutic methods involving pharmaceuticals stems from the failure to
understand that such method patents can be excluded and that,
nevertheless, the TRIPS requirement to respect pharmaceutical product
patents can still be honored. This failure is due, in turn, to a failure to
understand patent law itself, and the crucial distinction between product
and method patents. This is an ignorance that carries a high price. And in
health care, price has become everything.
89. It proves almost impossible to calculate exactly how many useful drugs are covered only
by method patents, and how many are covered by product patents. This is, at least partly, because if
one simply counts up issued patents, one has no way of knowing how many of those patents
really cover useful drugs. Only indirect measures are available, but they seem to yield consistent
results. For instance, the FDA lists twenty-four single drugs currently approved for use in HIV
infection treatment. See HJV Treatment: FDA-Approved HIV Medicines, NAT'L INST.
HEALTH, http://aidsinfo.nih.gov/education-materials/fact-sheets/21/58/fda-approved-hiv-medicines
(last updated Sept. 30, 2013). Of those, eleven are covered only by method patents (DLV, EFV,
ETR, ABC, FTC, 3TC, D4T, AZT, DRV, IDV, and TP), yielding a figure of forty-six percent. A
brief review of those patents shows that five have expired, making later patents depending upon
them almost certainly pure method patents. Others are close to expiration (some, of course, are just
at the beginning of their twenty-year term). Using the search "ABST(THERAPEUTIC OR
PHARMACEUTIC!)" in the Lexis Patent Utility File, shows that of the first fifty patents, thirty-six
were product patents and fourteen were method patents, yielding a figure-twenty-eight percent-
somewhat lower than the specific FDA-approved drugs. It seems probable, therefore, that perhaps as
many as one-third to one-half of patented drug therapies are method patents which might be
excluded from the patent regimes of developing countries pursuant to Article 27(3)(a). If you
include future attempts at evergreening, every last one would be excluded. And this, of course,
cannot be limited to HIV drugs. The newest malaria drugs are largely based on known chemicals,
mostly artesunate ("ARS"), which makes their patents essentially therapeutic uses, ready to be
excluded from patentability under Article 27(3)(a) by any nation with the determination and
competent legal advice to do so. See, e.g., Artesunate Is Available to Treat Severe Malaria in the
United States, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/malaria/
diagnosis treatment/artesunate.htmI (last updated Feb. 8, 2010) (describing the availability of ARS
for use as malaria treatment).
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